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Summary findings
Widespread  private capiral inflows to middle-income  capital inflows,  he applies the model to data for a
countries  have surged over the pasr three years. At the  representative  panel of middle-income  countries.
esame time, Brady-type  debr reduction operations  and  The main  empirical  resulr is that (except in Argentina,
domestic policy  reform took place, indicators of country  the Republic  of Korea,  and notably, Mexico), the surge
creditworthiness  improved dramatically,  and  of capital inflows appears  to be driven more by low
- international  interest ratcs plummeted. Which factors  returns in industrial  countries than by domestic factrt.-
most fully explain the wave of capital inflows?  How  So recent levels  of cap-.;al  inflows  would be unslistainable
:  sustainable  is it?  if global  interest rates returned soon to higher levels  and
Some see this new wave of voluntary capital inflows as  cautious  policies should be followed.
being mostly 'pulled" by attractive domestic  conditions,  Two other important conclusions  are obtained. First,
which open new and profitable investment  opportunities  depressed returns in industrial countries caused the
in the domestic  economy and improve country  improved creditworthiness  in indebted countries through
credirworthiness.  Under  this interpretation, if successful  their effect on discount rates. Country creditworthiness
domestic policies  are maintained,  capital inflows  will be  was an important transmission  mecthanism  for external
sustained.  shacks and is the key to reconciling  the push and pull
Others see these inflows  as being mostly "pushed" by  interpretations of market data.
conditions (especially  low interest rates) in industrial  Second, a sofr landing  appears feasible.  Stock
countries. Under  this interpretation, capital inflows  adjustment does not-appear to be a significanr
would diminish  and possibly urm  to outflows if  component of the adjustment mechanism  manifested in
- - sinternational  real inrerest rates returned to the higher'  the surge of capital inflows. In other words, the evidence
levels  of the 1980s.  5so  far suggests  that a gradual increase in international
*  . Fernandez-Arias  presents an analytical  model of  interest rates would result in less  capiral inflow, or
international  portfolio investment  in developing  moderate capital outflows  in some countries, rather than
countries based on non-arbitrage  conditions between  massive  capital outflows  that quickly bring do,>n the
external returns and domestic  returns adjusted by  srock of foreign liabilities.  By  and large, if there are
country risk. He uses the model to explain why the new  capital outflows, they are unlikely  to match past inflows
wave of private capital inflows is mostly  a middle-income  unless  the reversal  in external conditions  coincides  with a
country phenomenon.  To analyze  the issue-of  private  . worsening  of domestic conditions.
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Financial  Statistics.SUMMARY
Widespread  private capital inflows  to middle-income  countries have surged over the last
three years. At the same  time, Brady-type  debt reduction operations  and domestic  policy  refonn-
took place, country creditworthiness  indicators  dramatically  improved,  and international  interest
rates plummeted.  Which  factors are most important  in explaining  this wave of capital  inflows  and,
consequently,  how sustainable  is it?  This is a subject of debate with important  implications  for
policy as well  Fas  positive analysis.
Some  see this new  wave of voluntary  capital  inflows  as being mostly  "pulled"  by attractive
domestic conditions,  which open new and profitable  investment opportunities  in the domestic
economy  and improve country creditworthiness. Under  this interpretation,  successfiul  domestic
policies  are the key and, if maintained,  capital  inflows  would be sustained. Others, however,  see
t  - -Lhese  inflows  as being mostly "pushed"  by conditions in industrial  countries, especially  the low
interest rates prevailing  there.  In this interpretation, capital inflows would not be sustained  if
international  real  interest rates returned  to-  the higher levels  of the 1980s.
This paper presents  an analytical  model of international  portfolio  investment  in developing
countries based on  non-arbitrage conditions between external returns and  domestic returns
adjusted by country risk.  This model is used to  explain why the new wave of private capital
inflows  is mostly  a middle-income  country phenomenon.  To analyze  the issue at hand, the model.
is operationalized  and a tractable estimating  equation is obtained and used for a representative
panel of middle-income  countries. The main  empirical  result is that, with a few  -exceptions,  most
*  notably Mexico, the surge of capital inflows appears to  be largely driven by low returns in
industrial countries, as opposed.  to  domestic factors.  Consequently,  recent levels of capital
inflows  will prove to be unsustainable  if global  interest rates soon return to higher levels.The structural analysis  of this process yields  two important  insights.  First, it'is shown both
theoretically  and empirically  that depressed returns in industrial  countries  cause the improvement
of creditworthiness  in indebted countries  through their effect on discount rates, which supports
the view that country creditworthiness  has been an important  transmission  mechanism  of external
shocks  and provides  the key for reconciling  the "push"  and "pull"  interpretations  of'similar  data.
Second, soft landing  appears  feasible.  The dynamic  observed  behavior  of capital  inflows
does not, appear to  have a significant:component  of stock adjustment.  Therefore, prevailing.
conditions,  determine capital inflows irrespective  of their accumulated  stock. This implies that
sudden  capital  outflows.  rapidly  reversing  past.  inflows  are not to be expected unless  the reversal  in
external  conditions  is coupled with a concurrent  worsening  in domestic  conditions.INTRODUCTION
Widespread private capital inflows to  middle-income countries have surged over
the last three years.  At the same time, Brady-type debt reduction operations and domestic
policy reform took  place, country creditworthiness indicators dramatically improved, and
intemational interest rates plummeted.  Which factors are most important in explaining this
wave of.capital inflows and, consequently, how sustainable is it?  Policy designed to deal
with capital inflows and their consequences requires a clear understanding of these-issues.:
The surge in voluntary private  capital inflows over the  last few years  to  several
developing countries, including many of the classical Latin American debt crisis examples,
has reminded both analysts and policymakers that reluctant foreign investment.  and capital
rationing is not an unavoidable, sad fact of life and that international capital markEets  could.
again be a  significant.  source of finance.  Unfortunately, economists are not yet ready to.
answer whether these capital flows are being "pushed" by low interest rates in industrial
countries  or  "pulled  by  higher  returns  in  developing  countries,  nor  to  assess  the
sustainability of these capital inflows.
Some  see  this  new  wave  of  voluntary  capital  inflows and  rapidly  improving
creditworthiness as the evidence that  debt strategies have worked  and domestic policies
are on the right track.  In this view, domestic factors are more important than external
factors in explaining these inflows.  This is the "pull" story  (see Chuhan,  Claessens and
Mamingi, 1993).  It leads to the optimistic view that the sustainability of these flows is to
a large extent  a function of domestic policies which are under the control of developing
countries.  Under  this  interpretation,  successful  domestic  polices  are  the  key  and,  if
maintained, capital inflows would be sustained.  By contrast, for others (Calvo, Leiderman
and  Reinhart  (1993))  the surge  in  capital inflows is the  result  of  factors  external to
developing countries,  such as the fall in international interest  rates.  This  "push" story
leads to the concern that these flows are highly volatile because they are subject to factors
beyond the control of policymaker and calls for cautious policies.  In this interpretation,capital inflows would not be sustained if international interest  rates returned  to the higher
levels of the 1  980s.
The "1 pull" story in Chuhan et al. is partly based on the observation  that  country
creditworthiness  appears to play a very substantial rolec  in explaining the inflows compared
to  that  of  international  interest  rates.  However,  the  critical  and  seemingly  obvious
assumption that country creditworthiness  indicators reflect domestic factors as opposed  to
external factors, is unwarranted.  In this paper  I show, both theoretically and empirically,
that  external factors  have a  substantial  impact  on  country  creditworthiness,  a  channel
through which domestic economies are exposed to exogenous  shocks.  Therefore  country
creditworthiness  is not a good proxy for do., estic factors.  For -this conceptual  reason,  as
well as other  more technical reasons,  this paper radically.differs in  its interpretation  and
reaches very different conclusions despite broadly similar data.
In this paper, I find .clear support  for the "push" story.  With very few exceptions,
most notably Mexico,  external factors  appear to  be the.most  important  in explaining the
recent surge in capital infl&ws. Consequently, recent levels of capital inflows will prove to
.be transitoy  if  global  interest  rates, soon  return  to  the  higher  levels  of  the.  1980s.
Nevertheless, soft landing may be possible.  The dynamic behavior of capital inflows does
not appear to have a significant component of stock- adjustment.  Capital inflows appear to
be  responding  only  to  contemporaneous  conditions  irrespective  of  their  accumulated
stocks.  Therefore, they should not be. seen as a way. of accomplishing stock levels in line
with  prevailing  conditions,  a  result  that  could  be  obtained  depending  on  the  relative
importance of the channels through which inflows affect returns, as later explained.  This
implies that  sudden capital outflows rapidly reversing past inflows, that is negative stock
adjustments, are not to be expected unless reversal in extemal conditions is coupled with a
concurrent worsening in domestic conditions  -'3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This  paper  develops  a  structural  model  of  intemational  portfolio  allocation  in
which the importance  of country creditworthiness  is made explicit and its detenninants
analvzed.  This  structural  analysis is able to  overcome  some  of the  limitations  of the
"push" story in Calvo et aL.  where capital inflows in Latin America are proxied by changes
in  international reserves'  and  inferences are  based  only  on  the  statistical  analysis of
common factors.  First,  quarterly  portfolio  capital  inflows are  measured  directly for  a
comprehensive panel  of  middle-income developing  countries.  Second,  the  underlying
linkages and channels are addressed both analytically and empirically.  Third, the findings
in Calvo et al. appear hard to reconcile with the traditional portfolio model where the key,
- iChulat  et. al (1993) show that change  in reserves  is a poor proxy of capital  inflows.4
determinant of flows is return differentials.  In  such a model equal changes in domestic
'.  and foreign  returns  should have  effects  on flows equal in size. Since significant  changes in
domestic returns have systematically  failed to  cause large capital inflows over the  last
several years, the effects of international  interest rates in Calvo et al. would be implausibly
large compared to that of domestic returns. Furthermore, the absence  of voluntary  private
inflows to  entire regions, such. as Sub-Saharan Africa, contradicts the  presumption  -of
widespread inflows  across countries (as found in Latin America)  which is the basis for the''
conclusions in  their paper.  The  model here is, by. contrast, consistent with  all the
evidence.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I sketches a simplified  international
portfolio allocation model focusing on  the  role of  country creditworthiness and  its
determinants.  In  particular, it provides the  analytical framework.  for the  key  issues
discussed later in the paper:  -the nature of the factors underlying  the increased  inflows. the
-channels through which they  operate, and  their volatility and  dyniamic  implications.
Sec-ion II operationalizes  the model in section I by considering a suitable  burden-sharing
model of country risk and treating improvements  in the domestic economic  climate as an
underlying unobserved variable.  Section III contains the empirical  statistical,  analysis of
such a model in connection with the issues discussed above and Section IV concludes.
Appendixes  with statistical  information  follow.
1.  A SIMPLE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION MODEL
The  Model
The key reason why the financial  evaluation of foreign investment differs from
domestic investment is that the first requires the analysis of relevant "country" factors,
such as future exchange rates, balance of payments difficulties and controls, and, more
generally,  the various ways in which foreign  investors can be taxed implicitly  or expicitly.Returns to investment  abroad can be thoughit  as coming from two sour-ces:  the individual
"project" and global "country  factors.  The first  source is  com-mon  with domestic
invest.ors  of the recipient  counitry.  The second source is specific  to foreign  investors. 2
This second source of. returns is.particularly relevant and. caninot  be. ignored by
foreign investors invescing  in developing countries.  Its main com-ponents  are "volatility"
(for example,  -future  exchange  rates may  be subject to great uncertainty)  and "defau'lt  riskY"
While the first type of factors would only.  affect.  the variability of returns but not its 
expected mrean,  the presence  of "default:  risk" does reduce mean returns (swlas  further
increasing  return variability). The combina~tiion  of tl~iese  country factors results in the need
.for adjusting "project' returns: expected.mean  returns shiould  be revised downwards and.
variability  should be increasd.3
In developing  countries with substantial  default risk and low creditworthiness  the
effect of shocks on-  mean returns is likely to be relatively  more significant,  and therefore
dominate the effect on variability.  For these countries, first moments, as opposed to
second moments,  arc likely  to be a sufficiently  good approximation  to describe changes in
foreign investors' choices between investing  in these developing countries or elsewhere.
The standard mean-variance  portfolio models based on the trade-off's  between first arid
second moments facing risk-averse in'vestors is less relevant when default risk is not
negligible  aild country creditworthiness  is low.  First; shocks to country creditworthiness
can be  expected to  be relati'vely  more significant when it is low and therefore more
sensitive to the realization of uncertain developments.  Hence, in developing couintries
these shocks are likely to  be a more important factor in determiuning  capital inflows.
Second, once country creditworthiness  is too low, capital is rationed and the resulting
involuntary flows emerging from negotiations are  largely independent,  of  the  specific
Thsabstracts  fronm  "country"  factors affecting  domestic investors,which may lead to capital flight.
3Except under unlik-ely  negative correlation  conditions  betweven  project returns  and country  risk.6
characteristics  of the return profiles.  Therefore first moments are also the.key for the
characterization of these "corner'  solutions where lack of creditworthiness segments
markets  de  facto,
This simplified  model  of private international  portfolio  allocation  is based on non-
arbitrage.  conditions-  for mean returns for the various types of flows, indexed by s, which 
hold dynamically  in discrete periods.indexed  by t.  The three key variables  are: domiestic
"project" expected return Dst. country creditworthiness  adjustment  factor Cst (I  for a
develojped  country). and the opportunity cost  represented by the. return in developed
countries Rst.  In this context, Dst is the contractual return adjusted by idiosyncratic
factors.  From the point of view of.foreign investors of type s, the overall return bf
investing  abroad (the adjusted domestic  return) is DstCst and the-alternative  return (the
.foreign  return) is Rst.  The marginal  equilibrium  condition  for voluntary private flows is
the equality  between adjusted  domestic  and foreign  returns:
DstCst = Rst for s voluntary 4 [I] -.
Let Ft denote the vector of net flows fst across types s in period t.  Let St denote
the vector of end-of-period  stocks. While  Rst can be assumed  to be exogenous  given the
relative unimportance of developing countries in world financial  markets, both factors
underlying  domestic returns,  Dst and Cst, can be assumed  to negatively  depend on these
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S,
vectors. Domestic project returns decline  as foreign capital inflows  increase because the
- quality  of the pool of available  investment  opportunities  iu the domestic economy  decline
as a result of diminishing  returns and adjustment  costs. As discussed  later in the context
of burdensharing,  country creditworthiness  can be assumed to decrease as the stock of
I4n  the case of involuntary  flows such as commercial  bank debt in countries  where payments result from ex-post
bargaining  given die constraints on enforcing international  contracts, this condition wvould  hold as an inequality
(smaller  than).foreign liabilities  increase. Therefore:
DSt lDs(dt,Ft), DI >0 and D2  -0  .0  . [2]
Cst  Cs(ct.St,  C I >0 and C2 < 0  - .3]
where  dt and et are shift  parameters  reflecting  the underlying  economic  climate  concerning
the investment  returns  and the country's  ability  totpay respectively.
F.-.*or  voluntary private flows, say s]  to  v,  the v  non-arbitrage  equilibriunm
.t~~~~~  ~o  vout  prvt  flws  sa  s=  :.
conditions  in [1] hold.  For them,  flows fst are.  endogenously  determined  based on the
exogenous  variables  ct,  -dt and Rst. and their  initial  stocks  (as well  as stocks  and flows  of
other types of flows).  If country creditworthiness  is. extremely  low, these interior
equilibrium  conditions  may call for outflows  that exceed  the country's  payment  limit; In
that case, capital  rationing  and involuntary  flows reflecting  the country's  payment  ceiling
would  result  instead  (such  as the case of the involuntary  restructuring  of commercial  bank
debt). Involuntary  flows  (s>v)  are the result  of a "corner"  solution  rather  than  the interior
solution  yielded  by the non-arbitrage  conditions  [1], which  would hold as inequalities 5.
To make  the model  interesting  as an explanation  for the surge of capital  inflows,'  I will
assume  that the set.  of flow  types  that are voluntary,.  whose  level  is deternined  by the non-
arbitrage  conditions,  is large  and certainly  not empty. It should  be kept in mind,  however,
that if vO  tbe.above-mentioned  non-arbitragc  conditions  have no bite and all capital
inflows  would  be exogenous  to the model  and therefore  not affected  by its parameters.
Arguably,  this corner solution is  -a good representation  of countries  with very severe
creditworthiness  problems,  such  as Sub-Saharan  Africa.
5-This  paper  focuses  on volutntary  flows.  For an analysis of how involuntary flows are detennined in a bargainiing
framework  see Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias  (1991).In this model, under general regularity conditions and assuming that external
returns Rst are positive  functions  of Rt, a slift parameter reflecting  the underlying  external
investment  climate,  in equilibrium  voluntary  flows co-move  in the sense that shocks to the'
underlying parameters  -ct, dt,- and Rt cause them to  move in the same.  direction.'. This
condition  would therefore qualitatively  validate partial equilibrium  analysis. In particular,
for all voluntary  private flows s=l to v, it holds true that  sf 5 >O  when Ac>O  or Ad>O  or A
R<O. 6 Instead of attempting to specify further the general equilibrium  conditions that..
would determine the precise quantitative impact on each type of flow, here we simply
assume  that the above equation [I] holds for voluntary  private flows in the aggregate. Let
Ft and St denote these aggregate flows and stocks:  For simplicity,  let the parameters dt
and Ct subsume, respectively,  the flows and stocks of types other than private voluntary
(say commercial  bank debt inclusive  of Brady bonds and official  debt).  We then arrive at
the non-arbitrage  condition:
D(dt,Ft)  =Rt/C(ct,St)  [4]
This non-arbitrage condition equates domestic returns D  to  foreign returns R
multiplied by  1/C, which  can  be  interpreted as  the  country risk- premium factor.
Substituting  St-St_1+Ft allows to obtain both terms of [4] as finctions of Ft, which are
graphically  depicted  in Figure 2:
6Empirically, the dliscriniination  betwveen  equity and debt flows in the contex't  of  an earlier draft confrms this
theoretical presumption.9
Figure 2
F  Returns  :
:  R/C
Ft*  Ft  I
The -comparative  statics of private voluntary flows Ft can be -easily  derived by
totally differentiating  [4] (substituting  St and using the sign restrictions  in [2] and [3]) and
confirmed  by inspecting  Figure 2., The reduced-form  solution  is such that
Ft =F(dt.ct,Rt,St-1)  [5]
The slopes of the curves in Figure 2, and therefore the size of the comparative
statics  derivatives,  depend  on the sensitivity  of the functions  D and C to the equilibrating
flows as measured by DF and CS (since given the predetermined  St-1, C =CF).  The
impact  of various shocks  and policies  can be traced'through their impact  on those slopes.
For  example, the  policy of  counteracting capital inflows with  international reserves
accumulation  make's  the D curve flatter. To the extent  that domestic  project returns D are
depressed  by-net capital  inflows  (reserves  accumulation  amnounts  to investing  abroad), this-
pjolicy  requires  larger  infloWs  to have a given effect on D.  In-  this Model such a policyl:
magnifies  the effects of the underlying  shocks, resulting in larger capital inflows from
abroad  and increased  volatility. To the extent that country creditworthiness  depends on
gross foreign liabilities  and therefore gross capital inflows,  capital inflows are to some
extent  limited  at the cost of creditworthiness.
Stock Adjustment  and Dynamnics
Voluntary  capital flows F equilibrate  shocks to the system  through two channels:
- "project"  return D (flow adjustment)  and creditworthiness  C (stock adjustment).  The
relative contribution  of these channels  to the equilibrating  adjustment  depends on their
relative  impact  on overall adjusted domestic  returns DC.  On the 'margin  this is measured
by their relative elasticities  with respect to flows, that is (F/D)DF relative to (FIC)CS
(since CS=CF).  Since CS and DF relate to slopes in Figure 2, this can also be grasped
graphically.  The key parameter  summarizing  the relative  contribution  of stock adjustment'
is the relative elasticity  X=(CS/C)/(DF/D  + CS/C), which  under the assumptions  made in
[2] and [3] ranges  between 0 and 1. Two polar cases are interesting:
i)  Stock adjustment is ineffective  (X0).  In this case CS=0, which implies a
horizontal  R/C curve in Figure 2.  Here all the adjustment  takes place  through D and the
resulting  flow Ft from [4] does not depend  on the initial  stock St-1. Then:
Ft =  F(dt,ct,Rt)  [5i].
ii)  Flow adjustment is ineffective  (A=I).  In this case DF=O,  which implies a
horizontal  D curve in Figure 2.  Here all the adjustment  takes place through C and the
solution  to [4] can be rewritten in terms of stocks only:St - S(dt ctRt)  [5i-]
These.two polar cases have quite different dynamic implications. To see this.
consider  the case where at some point in time T the underlying  parameters return.  to their
initial levels at time 0 (that is, (dT,cT,RT)=(do,co,Ro)). In case (i), FT=FO. If in the
interim  period flows were larger than initially,  flows will decline  to reach the initial level
but outflows would not undo the accumulated  inflows in the interim period. In case (ii),
Sp-So.  Here  flows  would  not  only  decline  but  would  abruptly  turn  to  outflows
immediately  undoing  all the cumulative  gains  in increased  flows.
Sharper insights  can be obtained by explicitly  solving a linearized  version of [5].
Notice that by  differentiating  [4] it can be easily checked that  dFt/dSt l=-A. which.
provides an alternative interpretation of the parameter K.  A linear solution is fonnally
obtained  in the next section  in equation [14]. For our purposes here it is enough to write:
Ft=Kt-XSt  1  [6]
where the constant Kt depends  on the underilying  parameters (dtctRt)  and the coefficient
of  St-]  is -x as  discussed above.  It  is  clear. that  flows crucially depend on  the.
contemporaneous.  conditions reflected in Kt and that the worsening of those conditions
would lead to  flow reduction.  For any given Kt, inflows are  smaller Lhe  larger the
7~~~~
accumulated  stock and the parameter X as measured by XSt  -*7  The ratio x  =Kt/St-I  l
defines  a threshold level for X: if X?A,  a condition that large accumulated  stocks make
more likely, outflows would result.. More.  generally;  the contemporaneous  inflow_  level..
associated  with fixing  the condition  K to a certain level (for.  a given accumulated  stock) is
larger the  smaller the  parameter X.  In  particular, the -immediate inflow reduction
hn  gaphic terms, increasing  stocks mak-e  the cunre R/C to shift upwards over time.  Ceteris paribus, this leads to
lower equilibrium  tlows. The magnitude  of this reduction  depends on the slopes of both curves in suclh  a way that iL
ispropoitionial  to k12
associated with setting K to  a low level would be minimized  when ?=O.  In that case,
Ft=Kt  and  outflows would  result  only  when they  are  required by  the  underlying
parameters  as measured  by Kt<O.P
As noted above, if i=0 then the dynamics  of Ft collapses  into a static equation. lf
X is not zero 9. however, flows exihibit  interesting  dynamics. Rewriting [6] as a difference
equation in stocks, letting S be initial stock in the relevant period (t=O) and assuming for
simplicity  that over that period Kt takes the constant value K 10. the solution is:
St = K/L + (S-K/21j(l -)t  [7]
This solution is  stable and converges to  the  long-run equilibrium stock K/A.
Convergence is monotonic (increasing or  decreasing depending on whether the  initial
stock S is below or above the long-mn equilibrium),  where the speed of convergence  to
equilibrium  increases  with X (and is infinite  when X=l):  Notice that during an expansive
phase (S<KIX)  there is a trade-off between the level of the long-run equilibrium  and the
how fast that level is approached: for given K (and given initial stock S assumed to be
non-negative), the larger X, the faster the adjustment to  the equilibrium  stockl but the
lower such  equilibrium.  It  can  be easily shown that  this second factor prevails by
differentiating  [7] to obtain dSt/dX<O  for all t>O under the assumptions. In other words,
the smaller  X the faster stocks accumulate. Stocks accumulate the fastest when Xz=O,  in
which case St=S+Kt.
Alwavs  tmder the mainttined assumption  that a solvency  crisis does not develop. Otherwse the basic non-arbitrage
condition  would not hold and forced  repayments  would occur.
9 The previous  static case for X=0  can also be obtained as a limiting  case as X approaches  0.
10Smooth growth of K can be casilv modelled.  Anotlter wray  to interpret this simple fornulation  is that K is a
constant  fraction of the economys  GDP and that flows  and stocks are measured  as ratios to GDP.13
The dynamics  of a reversal of conditions as reflected in K can be analyzed usilig
[7]. Let K be the less favorable  conditions and S the accumulated  stock when the reversal
takes place. The bulk of the adjustmnent  takes place up-front, as can be checked  by taking
.~~~~~~~~~  I
time differences  in [71 to obtain: Ft=(K-kS)(  l-)t1.  Whether the new stock levels entail
outflows  depends on whether the initial  stock S is larger than the long-run  equilibrium  K/I
*  Permanent (as opposed to simply short-run) outflows would result if ?L>g (despite
decreasing  stocks), and. conversely,  permanent  inflows  if Xc<  . Regarding  the cumulative
adjustment  as measured  by S-St. if K is not negative  (the reversal  is not catastrophic),  then
the  adjustment is uniformly more  severe the larger the  parameter X  and is therefore
minimized  when X=O. The swiftness of the flow reduction and possible outflows if
favorable underlying  conditions reversed depends on x and is minimized  when 2 is zero.
Where the parameter  X lies is ultimately  an empirical  question, which is addressed as such
in section 11.11
Tke Role of Country Credtworthiiness
The creditworthiness  channel corresponds  to  curve C(ct,St) in Figure 2.  First, it
plays a role as part of the adjustment mechanism  through stock adjustments as long as
CScO as discussed above. Its effect is to dampen the flow adjustment needed to restore
equilibrium  (a consequence  of the positive slope of the R/C curve in Figure 2) and magnify
the  dynamic adjustment as discussed above.  Second, it plays a role as a channel for
transmitting shocks on  the  country's ability to  pay (ct9, either exogenous or  policy
iF  completeness, it may be  interesting to analyze the case wherc  c<O. This casc would require thiat  ceteris
paribus, given K, foreign investors be more willing to invest the larger their colletive  exposure.  The opposite
assumption is made in this paper on the grounds tdat cointry creditworthiness w%ould  decline in that case, and
therefore  2L4U  is ruled out by assumption. Wlhile  Ibis appears to be a very reasonable assumption,  the herd behavior
implicit in k<O  is not inconceivable,  perlhaps  as a rational response in the context of imperfect information. In that
case,  the solution in l7I  is explosive: stocks wvould  increase  (decrease) without  bound as long as S is bigger (smaller)
than KfA.14
determined  such as the level of debt outstanding.  12
Shocks improving country creditworthiness would move downwards the curve
R/C and cause capital inflows as an equilibrium  response. If effects on C are negligible,
the creditworthiness  channel Would  not be important for the transmission  of shocks.  If,
firther, stock adjustment is not significant,  then C is constant and the model collapses to
the traditional model where only returns Rt and Dt  matter.  In fact, in this case [5]
collapses to  Ft  F(dt,Rt).  Otherwise this  channel would  be  important for  the
determination  of voluntary  capital inflows.
Since the adjustment  factor C is at most one, when country creditworthiness  is not
an important  concern, such as in developed  countries, this factor is approximately  equal to
the constant one and therefore largely insensitive  to shocks and stock accumulation. In
that  case, this  channel is not  important and the  traditional model is applicable.  By
13 contrast, when country creditworthiness  is low this channel is potentially important.
The factors underlying  country creditworthiness  in that case, many of which are subject to
significant  variations,  are analyzed  in what follows.
Disentangling  ESternal  and Domestic  Factors
Whether capital inflows  are caused  by external or domestic  factors depends on the
ultimate nature of the shocks underlying  the adjustment,  rather than the channels  through
which they  operate.  While foreign return Rt  is  clearly external  and the  domestic
investment climate parameter dt  is  clearly domestic, the  factors underlying country
creditworthiness  and the country's ability  to pay index ct are less clear. To the extent that
'2The effect  of debt reduction  can also be analyzed  along the lines of this model. I leave this for  another paper.
1 As discussed above, when creditworthiness  is extremely loxv,  however, even if sensitive to shocks and stocks of
liabilities, country  creditworthiness may be irrelevant because capital is rationed and the solution for capital flowvs
collapses to a constant corner solution determined  outside the model, as opposed to the interior solution depicted in
Figure 2.the country creditworthiness  channel  is important,  the assessment  of thie  role of external
and domestic  factors requires  the analysis  of the nature of the factors underlying  country
creditworthiness.
The parameter ct depends on both external and domestic factors.  Conceptually.
this parameter can be thought as reflecting  the expected present value of the resources
available  for external  payments. On the one hand,  its present value nature implies  that it is.
sensitive  to the investors'  discount rate, which is of course an external  factor.  This is a
generally overlooked powerful channel of  external influence.  On the other hand, the
stream of resources being discounted is possibly  related  to resource bases such as export
earning capacity or public revenue capacity,  which in turn result from a combination  of'
domestic  and external  factors (such as world growth or terms of trade).
The key elements relevant for this analysis can be represented in the following
simple  model  of country's ability  to pay measured  by c (subindex  t dropped  for simplicity):
c = W/(i-g)  [8]
where the discount rate in the present value calculation  is i and the relevant wealth base
from which resources available  for payment in each period are obtained is assumed to
grow at the rate g starting  from the value W.
The appropriate (average) discount  rate in this present value calculation is some
medium or  long-term risk-free international  interest rate in the currency in question.
Similarly,  the (average)  growth rate g is some expected medium  or long-term  growth rate.
Under these simplifying  assumptions, the elasticity of c  with respect to  international
interest rates is minus 1(1-gA). Even if external  influences  underlying  W and g are left
aside, an interest rate elasticity of minus one (or possibly larger in absolute value in a
growing economy) amounts to  a potentially powerful channel of external influence.'16
Falling  international  interest rates may easily account for sharp improvements  in country
creditworthiness.  -
-11.  OPERATIONALIZING  TIIE  MODEL
In order to  make the  model empirically  tractable it  is required to  relate the
parameters and variables to  observable statistics.  I first analyze how to  measure the
country  creditworthiness  adjustment  factor and returns, and then specify  functional  forms
leading  to a tractable  closed-form  solution  for capital  inflows.
Country Credtitwortiness  and Burden  Shlaring
To the extent that the maximum  recovery  value of each type of foreign liability
depends at least in part on common  factors such as the factors underlying  the country's
ability  to pay index  c, shocks to these common  factors  will induce  co-movement  of those
values. When those maximum  recovery  values are below contractual  values,  they are the
market values of those claims and their ratio to  contractual values implicitly  defines
market prices.  In that case, shocks to  the country's ability to  pay translate into co-
movement  of implicit  market  pr.  qs-
This co-movement of implicit market prices allows to  relate the  default risk
associated with voluntary stock St to  the observable commercial  bank debt secondary
market price. Let Pt be the secondary  market price of commercial  bank debt stock Bt and
Qt be the (implicit)  price of commercial  voluntary  stock St.  Burdensharing  among  various
creditor classes  boils down to the rules that determine  the repayment  amounts that each.
class would  be able  to force the country  to make in present  value terms, which  depends  on
contractual  rights and bargaining  powers.  Here I assume a simple burdensharingmmodel
where the associated forced repayment capacities  of both classes are given increasing17
functions  fl and f2 of the capacity  to pay index c (subindex  t dropped for clarity).4 Then
P=fl(c)/B and Q=f2(c)S=f(PB)/S, where f is f2(fl-l)  and therefore f>O. Of course, the
above assumes that the resulting  prices P and Q are smaller than one, which in turns
implies  rationing  of both types of financing.  However, if f(PB)/S is sufficiently  large, then
the resulting  Q>1.  This is.arguably the relevant case currently in the countries under
review, where B is rationed but S is not.  In that case, Q=1 (in this simple  burdensharing
model  P is unchanged). In order to focus on P and S, which show much more variability
than B, I take B as constant. Consequently,  I assume that the sharing of country risk is
such that:
Qt = Min(1,f(PO/St))  [9]
By definition, the  country creditworthiness adjustment fictor  C  is  equal. to
expected  Q next period:
Ct =Et[Qt+l]  [10]
Assuming thai the pair (Pt,St) is. a  sufficient statistic for f(Pt+l)/St+l  (that it
absorbs all the relevant information  available  at time t concerning  that ratio), which is a
reasonable  assumption given that stocks move slowly.  and secondary market prices for
debt  incorporate expected  zero profit conditions,  then:
Ct=C(tS-  . [I  ]
:4This is a particular case of the "creditor-specific  collateral"  model in DeimgUc-Kunt  and Femandez-Arias  (1992).
See that paper for an elaboration  on how it differs firm the traditional "single collateral model and why, contry  to
the corporate  case,  it may be more applicable  in ffie  context  of sovereign  debt18
Of course, to  the extent that the market value for commercial  bank debt relates to  the
country's  ability  to pay index ct, the interest  rate sensitivity  of that parameter  discussed  above will
be transmitted  to the market  price Pt, and therefore  to country  creditworthiness  Ct through [11].
Measuring International Returns
Measuring  returns  R and i is difficult  because  unobservable  expected (ex-ante).  real returns are
needed. The usual  way out is to measure  ex-post real returns and hope that some  form of rational
expectations  will make this solution somehow  reasonable. A complicating  factor in this case is
that the relevant retums, especially  i,*  should refer to medium-term  maturities  which fall outside
the observabl_  time frame. Therefore  this quite imperfect  solution  is not even  feasible. 15
Within  the feasible  alternatives,  the various  choices  do not seem  to make substantial  difference  for
the issue at hand. First, yields  on various  maturities  exhibit  a large degree  of multicoDlinearity
which  makes  unimportant  the carefull  modeling  of the term structure. Second,  relevant  nominal
rates and observable  ex-post real rates are also highly  collinear. For example,  long-term  nominal
yields  (10-year  US bonds)  and ex-post short-term  real rates (3-month  US LIBOR deflated  by the
US GDP deflator)  track one another extremely  well  over the relevant  period (see Figure  3) and
their regression  yields  an R-squared  of 0.o.8  016
5Survey data on.  US infladon expecations could be very usefial  but to my knowledge there is  no available
information  for recent years.  Market information  on inflation-indexed  claims is not available.  to the best of my
knowledge. Iam not aware  of successful  forecasig  models  which could  be used for  this purpose.
- This supnsingly good  fit also holds for  longer  periods  of time.19
FiRure  3
Regression  of US  Noninal  10  year  bond  yield  and  the
real  3 month  LIBOR
1038  - Actual
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To make the presentation  cleaner  I chose not to distinguish  between the maturities
of the two intemational  returns R and i (they are both called R)..  Since i should.  be
medium-term as  explained above, a  ten-year maturity yield was used.  Given the
difficulties  in estimating the unobservable ex-ante real rates, nominal rates were used
instead as a proxy based on the assumption  that inflation  expectations  over the mediumn
term are slow-moving.  As shown  above, the use of other combination  of maturities  or ex-
post short term real  rates would not make much relevant  difference.
Capturing  the domestic  investment  climate
The measurement of retums within the domestic economy (D) would be even
harder than the measurement  of intemational  returns.  The instability  of the developing
economies.  makes  both nominal  rates and ex-post real rates not very useful for proxying
expected real retums.  In  particular, ex-post retums in  domestic stock  markets, a
commonly  used measure  for those countries  where it is available,  may contain more noise
than information.' 7
fiact  apart  from  bubbles  and  speculative  instability  in general,  changes  in stock  prices  rflect the rents  accruing-20
In any event, what needs to be captured is the domestic investment climate d, to
which flows react, rather than the resulting returns D.  That is not an easy task.  One
alternative to capture d, which can be interpreted as the-availability  of new investment
opportunities, is to measure the resulting investmrent  or savings volume.  One difficulty
witlh  this approach is that it would require careful modeling  of the investment  and savings
- ffunctions  in  order to  control for other variables as well as  endogeneity biases. 18 In
summary,  returns are not an appropriate proxy and domestic investment or savings may
* - introduce more noise than information  and yield misleading  results.  ideally,  the domestic
economic environment and policies should be incorporated explicitly.  In practice, this
exercise  is a difficult  one in a country study and even more so in a cross-country  study like
this one.
Fortunately,  while the  explicit modeling of the  underlying policies would be
unavoidable-if  the issue at hand were the evaluation  of policies,  for the present purpose it
is  sufficient to  consider.  the. domestic climate parameter (dt)  as  an unobservable and
estimate  its effect indirectly  as the residual capital flows which are not accounted for the
other variables.  in the model.  The assumptions  needed to recover such latent variable are
discussed  in Section III.
Solving the Emprical Model
A linearized  model is obtained  when the following  functional  forms are assumed as
empirical  counterparts of [2] and [3]:
to established finns due to investment rigidities in tapping new opporunities, which may have a tenuous relation
with the return of those opportunities. Large stock narket gains may be more the result of a rigid economy  than of
high-return investment opportunities,  either realized or still untapped.  The insignificance and sometimes wrongly
signed estimates for the effect of this variable in Chuhan et al. (1993) confirns these problems.
I 8 Whule this route appears worth exploring.  the lack-  of improvement  of low domestic savings rates in some of the
Latin American countries that are seen as successful in this study strongly  suggest that this approach would probably
only contribute  to an even stronger  'push" case.2  1
CtWPXCxp(-YSI)  [1]
Dt-d clxp(-ZFj)  - 1  3]
wherc WX,Y  atid Z  are positive constanis,  Recwizinig  the cquiliibriuim  condiiioni [41 in
logarithmic  iform  (log D +  log C  1 -log  R) anid  solving for Fl using [ 21 and [13] lekids  to
the following  linear empirical  countcrpart of [5] (tlhat  is ani  cxplicil  .form  of [6])D.
Ft =  It - Pirt  +  ypt - XSt-  I  [14]
where r and p are the logarithms  of interest rates and prices R and P respectively,  and F
and S are voluntary capital flows and stocks respectively. Regarcding  Ihe parameters, 13
=l/(Y+Z), y=X/(Y+Z),  X=Y/(Y+Z),  and the intercept is It=(log(dt)+1og(W))/(Y+Z).  The
general sign assumptions  on (X,Y,Z) imply that (,,y)  are positive and X lies between zero
and one (while  the intercept It is not constrained). This is of course in agreement with the-
general solution (5), since (It,rt,pt) proxies (the logarithm  ot) (dt,Rt,ct,  Notice that the
coefficient  of St I is X.=Y/(Z+Y)  as derived  in Section I and used in [6], where Kt=lt-Prt+
YPt. Furthermore,.the  structural parameters  (X,Y,Z) are identified  in this model since they
can be recovered from (f3,y,).  In particular, the elasticity of the (multiplicative)  country
risk premium  (1  IC) to secondary  market prices, equal to -X, can be recovered as -y/,B.
III.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Sample and Statistical Assumptions
The statistical analysis was conducted based on quarterly information  for  1989-
1992 and the first half of  1993, (indexed by t) for a  panel of thirteen middle-income
developing countries receiving private portfolio flows in the  period.  Since country22
*  ~~~creditworthiness  plays a' crucial role in  the  analysis, only countries with  consistent
creditworthiness  information  over time were'  included.' 19 The resulting-  panel  is still  highly
*  ~~representative. In terms of portfolio flows in the period, it represents 85 percent of
middle-income  countries  and 75 percent of all developing  countries. 2
Portfolio flows (both equity and debt 21 were used in the analysis  because high
frequency (quarterly) data  was  avaiable  and  the  purely financial nature of  these
transactions could  justify,  the assumption of no adjustment  lags. 22 Portfolio flows were
measured in dollars  and deflated  by the US CPI index to arrive at flows in -real dollars.
The stocks  of portfolio  liabilities  were proxied  by accumulating  portfolio  flow  after 1988.
The external  return and country's  capacity-to-pay  parameters,  Rt and ct respectively,  were
proxied along the-  lines  explained  in.  the previous section. External returns were proxied
by annualized  10-year  US bond nominal  yields. The country's capacity  to pay  -index  was
proxied  by the debt secondary  market  price except  for. Korea, Malaysia  and Thailand
where it is not available. An implicit  uni't  price was assumed  for these countries  to reflect.
that they remrained  -creditworthy  throughout  the period. 23 (For more details on-  the data
see Appendix I.)  For  the  reasons explained in the  previous  section, the  domestic
investment  climate  parameter  dIt  is indirectly  measured  as a residual.
The panel framework increases  statistical  efficiency  by assuming  that the relativ'e
effect on capital  flows of changes in external  returns and country creditworthiness  is the
1 9The  countries  are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama. Philippines, Poland,
Thailand,  Uruguiay  anid  Veneznd!a.
2Based oni  World  Bank-  (1  992) definitions  and statistics.
2Portfa1io  debt flows  include shiort-term  flows  except those trade  related.
Other voluntary  private flows,  namely foreign  direct investment,  are available only with annual fr-equency  anid  are
probably  -subject  to adjustment  lags. Preliminary  analysis  done in an earlier draft using  annual data showed  that the
same qualitative  conclusions  apply  to both  portfolio  and direct investmecnt
2The. credit-  ratings in fntsrizvlional  Inivestor-  fiurther  'supports  this assumption, sinc  the  ratings of these three
countries  are signficantly above  the ratings of the other ten.23'
same for all countries  in the period.  Relative  effect is meant to be relative  to the size of
the country (and is defined as capital flows as a fraction of 1988 GNP). 24 This makes
sense because these two explanatory  variables  are already standardized  across countries:
external  returns are common  and the country's  ability  to pay index is similar  in magnitude.
This relative measure can be expected to  eliminate  heteroscedasticity  problems. 25 As
usual, idiosyncratic  differences across countries are accommodated in country-specific
intercepts  to relax  the equality  assumptions.on  marginal  impacts.,
The final problem to be dealt with is one of identification. Because the domestic
climate  variable  is treated as a latent variable,  the country specific  intercepts  would reflect
not only structural country characteristics  but also that variable. This confusion  of both
effects  would not allow any attribution of capital  flows to domestic  climate through  inter-
country comparisons  unless  countries are assumed  to be structurally  identical. Even then,
the  common structural component would not be identified and therefore a complete
decomposition  of variable capital inflows, that  is their non-structural portion due to
changes  in the domestic  investment  climate,  could not be accomplished.
This identification  problem  was solved  as follows. First, all variables  (capital  flows
and stocks ratios, extemal returns and creditworthiness)  are measured as deviations  from
their 1989 average  level,  which  eliminates  structural  differences  across countries. In other
words, this model explains  the increase in portfolio  flows in terms of the chanees in the
explanatory  variables  taken 1989 as a benchmark. Second,  it was assumed  that there was
a country-specific  quantum change in the investment  climate in each country after 1989.
.- While  this is.  an imperfect  assumption,  it reflects the notion that in many countries.  there
24When  used,  stocks are also standardized  by quarterly  GNP.
25
It is worth noting that  equal absolute effects on flows, an assumption  sometimes used  in similar  studies, does not
seem  reasonable  in a panel with very dissimilar countries. This niisspecification  error is likely to lead to non-robust
estimations which, coupled with unchecked  heteroscedasticity,  would mostly reflect tie  larger countries in  the
sample,  thus undermiinig  the power  of the panel approach..24
was a policy  sea chatnge  after the Brady  Initiative'(  1989)  that underlies  the surge in inflows
thereafter. Then the portion  of the increase  in portfolio  flows due to improvements  in the
domestic  economic  investment  climate  in  each  country  (for  given  country
creditworthiness)  is identified  as the country  specific  intercept  in such.  a model. (The same
idea  was also used when analyzing  the.increase  in country  creditworthiness.)
Econometric  Estimation  and  Testing
Following  the derivation  in the previous section, the basic estimating structural
equation  is:
Yit  (xi  - lrt + YPit  - Xs;it.1  + uit  [15]
where r and p are the logarithms  of interest rates and prices R and P respectively,  y is
capital  inflow  as percentage points  of GNP and s results from its accumulation  over time.
All the variables  are expressed  as deviations  from their 1989 average.  level. The resulting
sample  size is therefore 182, resulting  from 14 quarterly  observations  (1990.1 to  1993.2)
over i3 countries  indexed  by i. The qualitative  analysis  conducted  in the previous  section
indicates that  the  country-specific  intercept (xi is  not  restricted, and  the  common
parameters  ,B,  y and K  are positive. In particular-  k is the fraction of the inflows  that can
be attributed  to stock adjustment  and lies  between zero and one.
The consistency  of OLS estimators  crucially  depends  on the uncorrelation  between
- . regressors  and contemporaneous  error terms. It appears  reasonable  to assume  that both.  rt
and Pit are uncorrelated  with uit: interest rates because they are exogenous and prices.
- because under the burdensharing  model developed in the previous section they do not
depend  on Sit.  The  absence of correlation  between Sit  and uit is plausible  as long as
errors are serially  uncorrelated. OLS estimation  of equation  [15] yields a slightly  negative25
point estimate.  for X (l=-0.08) and a Durbin-Watson  statistic in the no serial correlation
range for usual confidence levels (2.17),  This was interpreted as evidence that stock
adjustment,  and their dynamic  implications  discussed  above, are not an important  element
in the present  surge of capital  inflows.
In order to make the rest of the discussion  cleaner, it was assumed  that X=O  and
the explanatory  variable  si,t I  was neglected  in the rest of the paper.  Since  in light of the
theoretical discussion in  Section I  this parameter ranges between zero and one, th's
assumption  is filily  consistent  with the empiricai  evidence.  As discussed  in Section I, this
*  - pure flow adjustment mechanism  implies the lowest volatility in the case of a reversal.
*  . Consequently,  the estimating  equation  finally  selected  is:
Yit  (xi - + vit  + Uit  [16)
The estimation  using OLS leads  to the point estimates  b=3.46 and c=1.  1  7.  These
estimates have the  expected sign and are  significantly  different from zero  at  usual
confidence  levels. This implies  that both opportunity  costs and.  country creditworthiness.
are relevant considerations in investors' reactions.  In  particular, the  elasticity of the
country risk adjustment  factor to secondary  market prices can be estimated  as c/b=0.34.
The point,  estimates  ai, which reflect the impact of changes in the domestic conditions
beyond their  effect  on  creditworthiness after  1989, are  mixed and  certainly not
consistently positive.  Mexico is the  outstanding good  case, followed by Korea. and
Argentina.  Worsening cases include Algeria and Philippines  (and  also Chile due to
domestic  policy  restrictions  to capital  inflows  and a  successful  1989). (See Equation I in
Appendix  2.for further  details.)26
These estimators are the preferred ones after a number of tests were run:
i)  Alternative burdensharing models would lead to  prices p dependent on
stocks S.26 The endogeneity of prices could induce correlation between p  and u,
especially after  neglecting the  stock  adjustment  mechanism, biasing  the  results.
Instrumental  variable regression  where Pit was instrumented  by lagged prices yielded less
efficient point estimates not significantly  different from the OLS estimators.  This was
interpreted as  a  validation of  the  OLS  estimations and  eliminated the  need for  a
simultaneous equations  -approach  where prices  would be  endogenous, because such.
system can be a& 0umed to  be recursive.  In any event, if the IV estimators were used
instead the same qualitative  conclusions  would emerge.
ii)  Inconsistency due to  non-stationarity does not  appear to  be a problem.
The variables  used can be presumed  to be stationary  either because of their nature (interest
rates) or  because they are bounded (ratios, prices).  Nevertheless, the sample profile
appears to be consistent with a non-stationary situation. The Dickey-Fuller.  cointegration
test  was run  stacking vectors  of  within-country residual-based statistics and  the  no
cointegration  hypothesis  was clearly  tejeajed.
iii)  Serial autocorrelation of the disturbance term. does not  appear to  be a
problem according to Durbin-Watson statistic.  Zero autocorrelation is not rejected at
*  usual confidence  levels and therefore reported estimator standard errors are accepted. 27
Even then, this effect  can be expected  to be small as long as B/S is large.
if  anything, the  evidence points to negative, rather than positive, serial autocorrelation, possibly due  to the
luInpiness  of investment  with quarterly frequency.27
iv)  A random  effects  specification,  as opposed to the fixed effects  specification
implicit in  the  use of  deterministic country dummies, would lead to  more efficient
estimators  of. common  parameters if  the  country-specific random  component  is
uncorrelated with prices (interest rates are not a  problem because they are country
invariant). The point estimates  obtained with the error component  model were extremely
close to the ones obtained'  with fixed  effects (b'=3.40  and c'=  1.23), so that the use of this
method would have made no difference  for the conclusions.  Although  the Hausman  test
for the consistency  of the random effects model would allow its use at high confidence
levels,  the discrepancies  in the parameter  point estimates  were so small  and the theoretical
gains in accuracy under the null hypothesis  of ,zero  correlation so marginal that the
simpler  fixed effects  model  was selected. One of the clear advantages  of this choice is that
the  orthogonality properties  of  the  fixed  effects model  leads  to  exact  -factorial
decompositions  at the country level,  which  is exploited  in the tables that follow-
v)  Results are robust to the  proxies used.  As discussed in  the previous
section, the 10-year  nominal  interest rate used is very highly correlated with ex-post 3-
month real LIBOR, which would have been an  alternative regressor.  As-  noted  in
Claessens,  Diwan and Fernandez-Arias  (1992), debt prices for instruments  emerging  fror-i
Brady operations  do .not accurately  reflect country risk.  because of various enhancements.
The use of stripped prices in the relevant countries and periods made essentiasy no
difference (b'=3.46 and c1=I.15).  .
Decomposing  Capital  Inflows into Prximate  Causes  /
A country-by-country  decomposition  of the  increase in portfolio inflows (as a
percentage of GNP) after 1989, measured  as its average  level relative to its 1989 level, is
presented in Table 1.  The decomposition  is based on the average of each explanatory
f  . . . - f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
f  . - - . . :-,  As  ~  ~~  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'..:  .'-
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variable  (which are also measured  in terms of deviations  from their 1989.  level) multiplied
by its estimated coefficient.  The resulting three-way decomposition  is based on  the
following  equality  for each country  i:
y.=  ai  -br  + cpi  [117]
where  yi.  r. and p;  are averages  across time. Therefore this decomposition  based on first
moments  directly addresses the issue of what portion of the increase in flows is due to
changes in the explana'toiy  variables. Since the question is to assess the sources of the
surge of flows in the period (rather than its variation in general for which second moment
- - methods  are designed),  this methiod  appears  the most natural in this case. 28 Since interest
rates fell in the period, their contribution  is positive. Prices in most countries  increased  in
the period, making  also a positive  contribution.
28This decomposition  based on first moments is also invariant to the use of alternative explanatory variables
collinear with the ones used, so that results do not depend on the particular proxies chosen.  But unlike second
moment methods, it  is exhaustive (because each counurys  residuals add  up to zero due to OLS orthogonality
properties) and invariant to the order in which  factors are analyzed.  By contrast, to achieve this the traditional
Analysis or  Variance requires orthogonality  among regressors (which does not hold-  in this  case)  oT  arbirary
assumptions,  such as in decompositions  based  on standardized  coefficients.29
Table 1: Decomposition  of Increase in Portfolio Inflows after 1989
(percentagc  of GNP)
PROXIMATE
.___.__.___._  FACTORS  -_._._:
:  ncrcasc in  improving  Donestic  Rising CoLntry  Falling Intcritional
In1lows  Investmncti  Climatc  Credithvorthincss  Rclurms.
Algcria  . -0.21  -0.77  . 0.  (.13  0  0.43
Argentina  1.76  0.66  0,67  t0.43
Brazil  0.64  0.23  -0.02  (1.43
Chilc  -0.15  -0.94  . 0.36  (1.43
Malaysia  0.53  0. I1  (1.00  0.43
Korca  1.16  (3.73  0.0(n  - 0.43
Mexico  3.19  2.37  0.39  0.43
Panama  0.47  -0.48  . 0.52  0.43
Philippines  -0.23  :  -0.75  0.10  0.43. 
Poland  0.00  0.07  -0.50  -0.43
Thailand  0.47  0.05  0.00  0:43
Uruguay  0.72  0.16.  0.14  0.43
Venczucla  0.59.  -0.33  0.49  0.43
Average  . 0.69  0.09  - 0.18  0.43
- - . ____  100%  12%  25%  62%
Note :Mav  not Add up due to rounding  crrors
The average line reflects the decomposition  for,  a country in the sample taken at
random, that  is  a  "typical" middle-income  country creditworthy enough to  receive
portfolio  flows. This average  is the one that better reflects the qualitative  features of this
process  from the  point  of view of these  middle-income  countries.  By  contrast,  agareizate
portfolio  flows  to all countries  combined 29 are more sensitive  to the situation  in the larger
countries and its analysis  requires the calculation  of a weighted average kusing  GNP. as
weight).
The effect of  the  domestic investment climate is  mixed: in  some countries
improved and in some others deteriorated.  Only in  three countries of  the thirteen,
Argentina.  Korea and Mexico, it appears  to have had substantially  positive  effects. In the
9Arguably. to all developing countries because the sample is highly representative  in aggregate tenns.typical middle-income  country the improvement  in domestic investment climate has not
been  significant  and made only a marginal  contribution  to the attraction of portfolio  flows
(12%), which can be well accounted by the fall in international  interest rates and the
improvement in creditworthiness. Had the dcomestic  investment climate in developing
countries remained unchanged, we would have still witnessed a generalized surge in
portfolio  inflows  across countries.31)
Increased country creditwonhiness  played an important role in explaining  capital
inflows in many countries, but generally  smaller than that of international  interest rates
(with the only clear exception of Argentina).-.  For the typical middle-income  country
improvements  in country creditworthiness  made less than half the contribution  of interest
rates  (about 40%).32  (In. aggregate dollar terms over  the  developing world,  the
contribution  of improvements  in country creditworthiness  relative  to that of international
interest rates appears  to be about 30%)
The factor that clearly stands out. Is international interest rates, which ceteris
paribus "pushed" portfolio flows in the amount of almost half a point of GNP to these
countries over the period.  This mass of flows amounts to most of the portfolio flows.
received by the typical country (63%).3  Still, this. appears to  leave room. for .an
- important effect of "pull" factors.  As analyzed before improvements  in the  domestic
30While almost hair of the aggregate  dollar amount in the developing  world may be attributed to this factor, this is
mainly the result of compositional  etTects  due.  to larger countries doing better rather than a widespread and easily
-,  replicable  featurc of this phenomenon  in middle-income  cotmtries.
31Korea, Malaysia and Thailand were asswned to have an implicit unit price in tle  period, and therefore in these
countries  changes in creditworthiness  made  zero contribution  by assumption.
-2The same qualitative conclusions  were reached in an earlier draft based  -on annual observaLions  of total private
flows including foreign  direct investment. Using standardized  coeficients (the product of the absolute value of the
coefiicient  times the standard,dev'iation  of the  regressor)  to measure the relative contribution  of creditwvorthiness  also
leads to the same qualitative conclusions  in this model. It should be noted that, if at it is customary,  the regressors
are considered in levels rather than increments, creditworthiness  would,appear more important that interest rates
because  the between-country  variationi  of prices tlat the panel approach  is designed  to filter out would umduly  inflate
the variation  of prices.
33This represents  about 40% of aggregate  portfolio  flows.7-
31
investment climate in  the typical.  country were not  substantial, but  if  added to  ihe
contribution of  improvements in  creditworthiness (25%) they would amount to  an
unimpressive but  still important contribution of  37%.34  This would  be  a  gross
overestimation  of the contribution  of "pull"  factors, however,  because.  as explained  above
external  factors have an important  bearing  on country creditworthiness..  In what follows  I
tackle this issue empirically  and give a final  assessment  of the contribution  of external  and
domestic  factors.
Thze  Contribution of External (Push) and Donmestic  (Pull) Factors
In this model, the analysis  of the-role of external and domestic factors and the
assessment  of their contribution  requires the analysis  of the determinants  of secondary
market prices.  One non-structural  approach would be to  assume that co-movement  of
=
prices of different  countries  reflect external  common  factors and the rest of the variation
corTesponds  to  domestic factors.  In order to make the point that international  interest
rates are the ultimate driving  force in this "push"  process of capital inflows, here a more
structural approach is followed, where prices are explicitly  explained by intemational
interest rates based on the theory presented in -previous  sections.  To make the analysis
clean and simple, a constant price-interest  rate elasticity across the  10 countries with
creditworthiness  problems  (that is excluding  Korea, Malaysia  and Thailand) 35 is assumed:
Pit=i .- s rt + "it  [18]
341t could be further argued that the relative inaccuracy  with which  anld  T  are estimated  and the negative  correlation
between b and c due to some degree of multicollinearity  between the regressors  does not allow to rule out the
possibility  that the contribution  of creditworthiness  is significantly  higher  than 25% (up to about 50% if interest rates
are deleted from  the regression).
35Since  these countries  are assumed to have unit prices the theory  developed  in Section II does not.apply. For them
interest rates have no  4 effect  on (implicit)  prices.32
The intercept  J±j  reflects the change in domestic factors  leading  to improvements  in
creditworthiness  (as opposed to the domestic investment  clinate aj).  The parameter s is
.(the absolute value o6 the interest rate elasticity  and is expected to be positive.  In this
analysis, both  domestic  factors  and  external factors  (conservatively restricted  to
international  interest rates rt) act thirough  two channels:  i) directly affecting external and
domestic retums (j3rt  and ai respectively),  and ii) indirectly  through creditworthiness  for
those countries still having gains to  be made as described in equation [18.  For these
countries domestic and external factors are accounted for by ait and f'rt  respectively.
according  to the following  expressions:
*  ai'=cj+ypu;  - [19]
. .+7
-~~~~~f  -- y
The analysis  of the relative contribution  of domestic and external factors can be
done along the lines of Table 1 usin.g[19]. Considering  estimates  mi and e in [18] such
that pi.  mi  - er,  the nice features of the decomposition  are preserved.  (For Korea,
Malaysia  and Thailand [17] is not applicable  and no change needs to be made.)  In that
case  the resulting  decomposition  is:
Yi;  (ai+6icmi)  - (b+bice)r  .[2]
where 8i=O  for Korea, Malaysia  and Thailand  and b6I=  for the rest of the countries  in the
sample.
The more sensitive  prices to interest rates as measured  by the elasticity  e, the more,
important external factors compared to  domestic factors.  If e=O there is no extemal
linkage and it would be valid to  fully attribute,  the contribution of creditworthiness  to33
domestic  factors. In that case, the contribution  of external  factors to the increase  in flows
can be read directly from Table I (63% for the typical country) and the rest can be
attribLIted  to  domestic factors,  acting  eitlihe directly or- throuigh improvements in
creditworthiness.  If  e>0  as  expected,  however, not  all  of  the  improvement in
creditworthiness  is due to domestic factors and the contribution  of external  factors would
be higher because  of their beneficial  effect on creditworthliness.
It is clear from [20] that the average contribution of external factors is a linear
function of the elasticity  parameter e. For example,  taking  the benchmark  value e= I as the
value of s in [18], which  has been the (accepted) null hypothesis  in some.  empirical  studies
(such as in Cohen and Portes (1990) and, more recently, Demirguc-Kunt  and Fernandez-
Arias (1992)>  and external factors  would account  for as much as 78 percent of the increase
in flows in the typical  country. 36
In  what follows, s  is. estimated and  the  corresponding country by  country
decomposition  presented. Since wit and uit are assumed  to be uncorrelated  (as explained
and tested above), then the two-equation system formed by equations [16] and [18] is
recursive and OLS in each equation is consistent and fully efficient under the  usual
assumptions. Running  OLS on [18] leads to e=1  .49 with an estimated standard error of
only 0.14 (see Equation 2 in Appendix 2 for more details).  This elasticity  is consistent
with the theoretical  presumption  discussed  in the previous  section.  Since e is a consistent
estimator, [19] yields consistent estimates. Furthermore, since orthogonality conditions
are preserved  [20] can be applied to obtain  Table  2:
36Othier  wtork-s  also shiow-that  world interest  rates are a central  determiniant  of debt prices, stich  as l)ooIly anid  Stonie
(1993) and B3ulow,  Rogoff  and Bevilaqun  (1992).>34
Table  2:  Domestic  and External  Contriblutions  to Increase  in PortfolioFlows  after 1989
(percentage  of GNPl
Donieslic  Factors  Exicrnal  Factors.
Increasc  iin.  orwhichi  ihroiglii  of  whicic  tlhrouighi
.iflovws  Totai  credihworihincss  Totil  creditworthiness
Algeria  -01.21  -(0.86  40,119  0.64  11,22
Argeintina  1.76  1.11  0.46  11.64  0.22
Brazil  0(.64  (0,1)  -0.24  01.64  11.22
Chlile  -0.15  -(14(0  0.14  10.64  0.22
Malaysia  (1.53  (1.  11  .1  11.43  0,n(1
Korcea  1.16  (10.73  0.0  0.43  . (.0(.
Mcxico  - 3,19  . 2.55  0.18  -1.64  . (1.22
P3aniama  (0.47  -(3.17  (1.31  0.64  11.22
Plhilippincs  -0.23  -(1.87  -0.12  0.64  0.22
Poland  0.00  -0.64  -0.71  0.64.  .(.22
Thailand  0.47  (1o1s5  (0.(  (1.43  0.(  -
Uruguav  . . (0.72  0.1)8  -0.08  0.64  0.22
Veneczula  0.59  -(EsQ.  0.28  11.64  (1.22
Average  0.69  0.  1  0.01  0.59  0.17
_________________  100%  14%l  86%
Notc :May not Add up due to rounding  errors.
The previous analysis  lends  support to the push story.. International  interest rates
appear to be the driving  force and domestic  factors appear to have played  a rminor  role in.
attracting capital inflows, with the exception of Argentina, Korea and Mexico.  This
finding  would hold even if the direct effect of interest rates as measured  by f  is assumed
to be substantially  lower than the OLS estimate b due to the sizeable indirect effect of
interest rates through country creditworthiness.  For  the typical country, the  fall in
international  interest rates explain 86% of the increase in inflows. True, due to the fact
that,  overall, domestic factors have been more favorable in  larger countries 3 7,  the
contribution of external and domestic factors to  aggregate inflows is roughly equal.
Irrespective of whether this correlation between domestic.factors and country size is
coincidental  or not,.  an issue which is not analyzed  in this paper, this compositional  effect
should not  obscure the  "push" nature of  the  phenomenon.  If  the  association is
37For example,  Argentina,  Korea and Mexico  combinied  have 40% of total sample GNP.coincidental.  then.  the picture for the typical  countiy is r epresenitative  of all middle-incomiie
countries and is also a  good  estimate  of  their prospects  in the  agregate  I1 such
association  is systematic,  the  analysis  of thc  typical  CuLintry  WOLId  still be  represecnfative  of
middle-income  countries with only some.  exceplions, and thierefore  applicable to  miuost
countries.
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Sustainability  of capital inflows is generally recognized as a key parameter fo  r
policy  design.  Unsustainable  capital  inflows call for polices aiined at leaning against the
wind. This paper shows that the sustainability  of capital inflows is vulnerable  to external
factors even when accompanied by improved country creditworthiness, but  that  soft
landing  is possible.  Therefore it gives support to measured optimism if cautious policies
are followed. Four main  points support that conclusion:
i)  In terms of proximate causes, improvements  in country creditworthiness  appear to be a
significant variable to  explain investors' behavior and the  surge of  capital inflows in
middle-income developing  countries.  But,  to  a  large  extent,  developing  country
creditworthiness has been  in turn  driven by  external factors,. especially international
interest rates.  The previous finding on  the  importance of improvements in  country
creditworthiness  is best seen as a channel through which the unctkrlying  factors, external
factors for the most part, induced capital inflows.
ii)  In terms of causal underlying factors, the surge of capital inflows in most countries
appears.to have been largely pushed by low returns in developed  countries, both directly
or through the country creditworthiness  channel,  as opposed to being pulled by domestic36
factors.  Even if domestic conditions in middle-income  countries had remained  unchanged
we would have witnessed a surge of capital inflows  driven by lower international  interest
rates.  There are important country exceptions, namely Argentina, Korea and,  most
notably, Mexico, but in most countries no surge in inflows would have taken place in the
absence of the remarkable reduction in international interest rates.  It can be further
argued that for developing countries not receiving capital inflows,.  such as sub-Saharan
African  countries, such reduction was not large enough to elimin'ate  credit rationing.
iii)  Consequently, most developing countries are  vulnerable to  adverse exogenous
developments that would render capital inflows unsustainable:  Capital inflows in the
typical country are largely dependent on favorable international interest rates and would
not be sustained if they return to higher levels.
iv);  But  soft landing appears feasible.  Stock adjustment does not appear to  be a
significant  component of the adjustment mechanism  manifested  in the surge in inflows. In
other words,  the evidence so far suggests that a gradual increase in international  interest
rates would result in lower capital inflow levels; or moderate capital outflows in some
countries, rather than massive  capital outflows to quickly  bring down the stock of foreign
liabilities. By and large, if there are capital outflows, they are unlik-ely  to match past
inflows unless the reversal in external conditions is coupled with a concurrent worsening.
in domestic  conditions.37
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Total Portfolio Flows. Source:IECDI staff estimates
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International Financial  Statistics. The monthly interest rate was
taken and the quarterly annualized  average was calculated.
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weekly data was taken and the quarterly average was calculated..
Source: Salomon Brothers.
P -- - .Gross  National product - Source - IMF International  Financial
Statistics
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Financial Statistics.Dummy  Variables
ALG  - Algeria
ARG  Argentina
BRA  = Brazil
CHI  =  Chile
KOR  = Korea
MAL  =Malaysia
iMEX  = Mexico
PAN  - Panama,
pHI  - Philippines
POL  = Poland
TlHA  = Thailand
- URG  Uruguay,
'=EN  =  Venezuela






ALG  -0.77  0.36
ARG  0.66  0.42
BRA -0.23  0.36-
CHI  -- 0.94  0.37
MAL  0.11  0.36
KOR  .0.73  0.36
MEX  2.37  0.37
PAN  -0.48  0.39
PHI  -0.75  0.36
POL  0.07  0.45
THA  0.05  0.36
URG  0.16  0.36
VEN  -0.33  0.38
LRDEV  -- 3.46  0.97
LPDEV  -1.17  0.50-







ALG  -0.0767  0.0583
ARG  0.391  0.0583
BRA  -0.201  0.0583
CHI  0.123  0.0583
MEX  0.152  0.0583.
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